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COMMENTARY
China’s Global Expansion and
Latin America
RHYS JENKINS
Abstract. China’s rapid growth and increased integration with the global economy
over the past three decades have signiﬁcant economic impacts and political im-
plications for Latin America. This paper reviews the debate over whether these
impacts have on balance been positive or negative for the region. It argues that those
who emphasise the positive economic impacts of China have been over-optimistic
and underplay some of the negative impacts associated with Chinese competition in
manufacturing and increasing Latin American specialisation in primary products.
On the other hand, when focusing on the political dimensions, there has been a
tendency to exaggerate both the extent of China’s inﬂuence in the region and the
fears to which this gives rise, particularly among US commentators.
Keywords : China, Latin America, trade, foreign investment, competition, US he-
gemony, democracy
Introduction
China’s rapid economic growth and increased openness has been one of the
most signiﬁcant developments in the global economy over the past three
decades. This re-emergence of China dates from the late 1970s, when Deng
Xiaoping began the process of reform and economic opening. While Latin
America entered a decade of economic stagnation in the 1980s, China was
starting a period of rapid economic growth. Since 1980 the Chinese economy
has grown at almost 10 per cent per annum, and as a result per capita income
has increased sevenfold. China is now poised to overtake Japan as the
second-largest economy in the world, behind the United States.
As well as experiencing rapid growth, China also became much more
integrated with the global economy. Its share of global trade rose from less
than 1 per cent in 1980 to around 8 per cent, and in 2009 it became the
world’s largest exporter ahead of Germany. China’s growing trade surplus
led to the accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves and to the country
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becoming a major purchaser of US treasury bonds. China has also become
a major destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), accounting for over
5 per cent of global FDI inﬂows between 2005 and 2008.1 Although it is
starting from a low base, outward investment from China is growing rapidly
and several Chinese companies have become important global players,
particularly in the extractive industries.
Although China’s rapid growth is not unprecedented, showing similarities
with earlier growth episodes in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, what is
diﬀerent about China is the sheer size of its economy. This means that the
increased competitiveness of China and its expanded presence in world
markets is having a major impact on both developed and developing
countries. It has been estimated that China accounted for 12.8 per cent of
world economic growth between 1995 and 2004, and this has been projected
to rise to 15.8 per cent for the period 2005–20.2 With the world recession,
China’s contribution to global growth has taken on even greater signiﬁcance.
China’s economic rise has also led to it becoming a much more signiﬁcant
player in global politics, as was highlighted by its role in the Copenhagen
Conference on Climate Change in December 2009. China has, of course,
long had a privileged position as a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council, but in recent years it has become more directly involved in
other institutions of global governance such as the G-20, the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
It has also aligned itself with other large emerging economies, forming the
so-called BRICs with Brazil, Russia and India.3
The re-emergence of China as a major global power has led to consider-
able debate over the likely consequences for the rest of the world. Eco-
nomically, the positive view highlights the major contribution that China has
made to the growth of the global economy, particularly with its continued
expansion in the aftermath of the credit crunch, which has prevented a more
severe global recession. Critics, however, have argued that China, with its
large trade surplus, has been a major source of global imbalances and hence
has contributed to the instability of the global economy.
There are also debates over the geopolitical implications of China’s rise.
One view sees China as a threat to the United States’ position as the sole
superpower after the ending of the ColdWar. This challenge to US hegemony
1 Calculated from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Report, 2009 : China Country Fact Sheet, available at www.unctad.org/sections/
dite_dir/docs/wir09_fs_cn_en.pdf.
2 Alan Winters and Shahid Yusuf, Dancing with Giants : China, India and the Global Economy
(Washington DC, 2007), Table 1.1.
3 The term BRICs was coined by Goldman Sachs’ chief economist, Jim O’Neill, in 2001. The
ﬁrst oﬃcial summit between the leaders of the BRICs was held in Russia in 2009.
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is seen as a cause of instability and potential conﬂict in the future. The oﬃcial
Chinese position, in contrast, emphasises China’s ‘peaceful rise ’ and seeks to
downplay any potential conﬂict.4 Although many are sceptical about Chinese
rhetoric in this regard, this more optimistic view of the political implications
of China’s global expansion is partly shared by some commentators.
The debate on the economic impact of China on the developing world
began at the time of China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Initially, a major
focus of attention was the likely eﬀect of Chinese competition on exports
from other developing countries to markets in the developed world.5 More
recently, a great deal of attention has been paid to the growing presence of
China in Africa.6 This has focused not only on the economic impacts but
also on the political implications of China’s relations with states such as
Sudan, Angola and Zimbabwe. There is also now a growing literature on the
impacts of China on Latin America, although, at least in Europe, this has
attracted rather less attention than China’s involvement in Africa.7
As is the case with the literature on the global implications of Chinese
expansion, there are contrasting views concerning China’s impact on the
developing world. The optimistic view stresses the signiﬁcance of the
growing Chinese market for exporters in the South and the contribution
made by increased Chinese demand for raw materials to the commodity
boom after 2002, which beneﬁted many developing countries. It also points
to the contribution made by Chinese aid and investment to building infra-
structure in developing nations. Economically, the Chinese economy is seen
as complementary to those of other developing countries that stand to gain
from China’s growth. Politically, the optimists see China as oﬀering an
alternative to the domination of the old colonial powers in Africa or the
4 Jiang Shixue, ‘The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective ’, in Riordan Roett and Guadalupe
Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere : Implications for Latin America and the
United States (Washington DC, 2008), pp. 27–43.
5 See for example, Mehdi Shafaeddin, ‘The Impact of China’s Accession to WTO on the
Exports of Developing Countries ’ (UNCTAD Discussion Paper no. 160, Geneva, 2002) ;
and Yongzheng Yang, ‘China’s Integration into the World Economy: Implications for
Developing Countries ’ (IMF Working Paper WP/03/245, Washington DC, 2003).
6 On China’s growing relations with Africa, see, for example, Andrea Goldstein et. al., China
and India : What’s in it for Africa (Paris, 2006) ; Rhys Jenkins and Chris Edwards, ‘The
Economic Impacts of China and India on Sub-Saharan Africa : Trends and Prospects ’,
Journal of Asian Economics, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 207–25 ; Chris Alden, China in Africa
(London, 2007) ; Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road : China and India’s New Economic
Frontier (Washington DC, 2007). Recently two special issues of journals have been devoted
to the role of China in Africa : see Review of African Political Economy, vol. 35, no. 1 (2008) ;
and European Journal of Development Research, vol. 21, no. 4 (2009).
7 An interesting comparison could be made between China’s role in Latin America and its
role in Africa, where despite certain parallels in terms of the economic links that have
developed, there are signiﬁcant political diﬀerences in terms of governance structures and
the role of the United States. For reasons of space, this will not be attempted here.
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United States in Latin America. Particularly in Africa, this is reﬂected in the
tendency for Chinese aid to involve far fewer conditions than those imposed
by Western donors. Even for Latin America, the emergence of China can be
seen as a counterweight to US inﬂuence in the region.
There is, however, a more pessimistic view of the impact that China is
having on the rest of the developing world. This emphasises the competition
between China and other developing economies. China represents a threat to
the exports of other Southern exporters of manufactures, while imports
from China compete with producers on the domestic market. China’s high
level of competitiveness in manufactured goods and its booming demand for
primary products is tending to push other developing countries back into
specialising in commodities, which do not provide the same dynamic bene-
ﬁts as the manufacturing sector. Chinese investment simply serves to re-
inforce this specialisation, while at the same time other foreign investors
divert their investment from other developing countries to China. Politically,
the pessimistic view sees China as undermining a trend towards increased
democratic governance in the developing world, both through its example of
successful economic development under an authoritarian political regime
and through its support of repressive governments that violate human rights.
This Commentary examines these debates in the context of China’s impact
on Latin America. The next section describes the growth of relations between
China and the region, and the drivers that have contributed to closer eco-
nomic and political ties. This is followed by an examination of the main ways
in which China has aﬀected the economies of the Latin American countries.
A similar discussion of the political implications of the rise of China then
follows. The conclusion suggests that the optimists have exaggerated the
economic beneﬁts of the growth of China for the region while playing down
some of the more problematic aspects of the relationship. On the other hand,
in the political sphere it is the pessimists who have been most prone to
exaggeration in their claims that China is having a negative impact on the
region.
Growing Relations between China and Latin America
Links between China and Latin America really took oﬀ from the late 1990s
but only began to attract signiﬁcant global attention with the visit of the
Chinese president, Hu Jintao, to several Latin American countries and to the
summit of the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Forum, held in Chile in 2004. It was
not until 2008 that the Chinese government issued its ﬁrst policy paper on
Latin America and the Caribbean.8
8 People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America
and the Caribbean (Beijing, 2008).
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The most striking evidence of China’s growing involvement in Latin
America is the increased level of bilateral trade (see Figure 1). Between 1999
and 2008, total trade (exports plus imports) increased almost twelvefold to
US$ 150 billion. As Figure 1 shows, Chinese imports from Latin America
began to grow rapidly at the end of the 1990s. China’s rapid economic
growth had, by the late 1990s, outstripped domestic supplies of raw materi-
als, and the country was becoming a net importer of a number of key com-
modities. China’s exports to the region grew steadily during the 1990s,
reﬂecting the country’s emergence as a global trading power, but then ac-
celerated rapidly from 2003 onwards, following its accession to the WTO in
December 2001.
Trade is the dominant element in the economic relationship between
Latin America and China. Although the visit of Hu Jintao to the region in
2004 was accompanied by expectations of large inﬂows of FDI from China,
these never materialised. Chinese FDI ﬂows to Latin America, excluding
Caribbean tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin
Islands, did increase sixfold between 2005 and 2007, but they accounted for
only about 1 per cent of total Chinese FDI outﬂows and a similar share of
total FDI inﬂows to Latin America.9 Latin American FDI in China has been
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Fig. 1. China and Hong Kong’s Trade with Latin America, 1990–2008 (US$ million). Source :
author’s elaboration from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
9 Rhys Jenkins, ‘The Latin American Case ’, in Rhys Jenkins and Enrique Dussel (eds.), China
and Latin America : Economic Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Bonn, 2008), p. 42.
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even less signiﬁcant : total bilateral ﬂows, which came to around US$ 400
million in 2007, were dwarfed by total trade in the same year, at around US$
100 billion.10
Similarly, Chinese aid, in the form of grants or concessionary loans, has
not been very signiﬁcant in Latin America. This is in marked contrast to
Africa, where China has become a major donor.11 However, some of the
smaller Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Costa Rica and
Grenada, have received Chinese aid as part of China’s competition with
Taiwan to gain diplomatic recognition.
Closer economic ties with Latin America have been accompanied by
stronger political links. China has signed ‘strategic partnership agreements ’
with Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003) and Argentina (2004), in addition to an
earlier agreement with Brazil (1993).12 Over the past ﬁve years the number
of countries in the region that recognise the PRC has increased with the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Dominica (2004), Grenada (2005)
and Costa Rica (2007) ; President Lugo in Paraguay announced after his
election that he intended to recognise the PRC as well.13
China is also becoming increasingly involved in multilateral fora in the
region. After initial resistance, it was accepted as a member of the Inter-
American Development Bank in 2008. It has also had permanent observer
status at the Organization of American States since 2004. China is a member
of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation, established in 2001,
which brings together ministers and oﬃcials from 33 countries in the two
regions. It has also initiated a series of dialogues with regional organisations
such as Mercosur and the Andean Community.
What, then, have been the main drivers of closer links between China and
Latin America? The rapid growth of Latin American exports to China from
the end of the 1990s was a result of the increased reliance of China on
imports of key raw materials to fuel its industrial boom and to meet the
changing food consumption patterns that accompanied higher income levels.
This is reﬂected in the composition of the region’s exports to China, a large
and increasing proportion of which comprise unprocessed primary products
such as copper, iron ore, crude oil and soybeans (see Table 1).
10 Ibid.
11 Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia (Washington DC, 2009), Table 3.
12 China adopts three labels to characterise its relations with other countries. They are, in
descending order of importance, ‘ strategic partner ’, ‘ cooperative partner ’ and ‘friendly
cooperative relations ’ : Jorge Domı´nguez, China’s Relations with Latin America : Shared Gains,
Asymmetric Hopes (Washington DC, 2006) p. 23.
13 In 2007, following a change of government, St. Lucia switched its diplomatic recognition
back to Taiwan, after ten years of recognising the PRC.
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The growth of these exports has been driven by Chinese demand rather
than by any initiative from the Latin American side. Growing demand from
China drove up the prices of key commodities from the region and provided
a new market for exporters. China’s interest in diversifying its sources of raw
materials, and in securing a stable supply of those materials, led it to expand
its imports from Latin America. From the point of view of the region, this
was largely a windfall that it had done little to promote.
Chinese growth has relied heavily on exports, with the result that the
expansion of foreign markets has been critical for the success of the model.
The Chinese government had been seeking to join the WTO since its in-
ception in 1995 and eventually did so in 2001. Following its accession, China
was granted most favoured nation treatment by the other WTO member
countries, and although a number of Latin American countries insisted on
measures to restrict Chinese imports for a transitional period of up to ten
years, membership gave China better access to Latin American markets. This
was followed by a surge in imports of Chinese-manufactured goods
throughout the region.
China’s access to Latin American markets has been a source of conﬂict,
particularly in the more industrialised countries of the region. Local manu-
facturers have complained that they are adversely aﬀected by Chinese com-
petition, and this has led to anti-dumping measures being taken against
Chinese goods.14 The Chinese government, on the other hand, has put
pressure on Latin American governments to grant it ‘market economy sta-
tus ’ within the WTO, which would make it more diﬃcult to prove dumping
Table 1. Composition of Latin American Exports to China, 1995, 2001, 2006
(% share)
1995 2001 2006
Primary products 35.0 56.5 62.5
Manufactured goods 65.0 43.5 37.5
Of which :
Resource-based 43.3 21.4 22.8
Low-technology 10.1 6.5 3.7
Medium-technology 10.4 8.3 6.3
High-technology 1.1 7.3 4.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
14 See Andre´s Lo´pez and Daniela Ramos, ‘The Argentine Case ’, in Jenkins and Dussel (eds.),
China and Latin America, pp. 65–157; Daniel Saslavsky and Ricardo Rozemberg, ‘The
Brazilian Case ’, in Jenkins and Dussel (eds.), China and Latin America, pp. 159–226.
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and thus to apply anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports.15 In
recent years, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela have all granted
China this status.16
Thus, as in the case of Latin American exports to China, the growth of
imports from China has also been largely promoted by China, leading to
some resistance within the region to the growth of trade between the two
countries, at least from some sectors. Where Latin American governments
have been particularly keen to develop bilateral relations, in contrast, has
been through FDI, particularly investment by Chinese ﬁrms in the region.
But, as has been noted already, this is the area where local hopes and
expectations have not been met, and China is still a long way from becoming
a major source of investment in the region.
What Chinese FDI has taken place has been closely tied to the two main
economic interests of China in the region: extractive industries, such as oil
and mining, and assembly activities, which are a means of obtaining better
access to the Latin American market. Examples of the former include the
acquisition of Encana’s oil and pipeline interests in Ecuador by Sinopec and
PetroChina, CNPC’s shareholding in PlusPetrol Norte in Peru, and
Sinopec’s investment in Omimex de Colombia.17 Market-oriented invest-
ments include Gree (air conditioners) and SVA (electronic products) in
the Manaus free trade zone in Brazil, and TLC (TVs, air conditioners and
electronic products) in Tierra del Fuego in Argentina.18
The development of the relationship between China and Latin America
in areas other than the economic ﬁeld has, in the main, been a result of
closer economic relations between the two countries. There is one notable
exception, however, which is in relation to Taiwan. Half the countries in
the world which continue to recognise Taiwan are in Latin America and the
Caribbean. These include Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and some
15 In the case of a country which does not have market economy status, a complainant can
prove dumping by comparing the prices charged for imports, in this case from China, with
production costs in some other country, since costs in a non-market economy are not
necessarily a good indication of real cost. When a country is recognised as a market
economy, dumping can only be shown to occur when it sells goods at a price below their
cost of production.
16 Congressional Research Service, China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power ’ in South America, Asia,
and Africa (Washington DC, 2008), p. 26.
17 Duncan Freeman, Rhys Jenkins and Jonathan Holslag, ‘Chinese Resources and Energy
Policy in Latin America ’ (report prepared for the Development Committee of the
European Parliament, EP/EXPOL/B/2006/33, 2007).
18 Alexandre Barbosa and De´bora Miura Guimara˜es, ‘Economic Relations between Brazil
and China in the Consumer Electronic Sector ’ (University of East Anglia, programme on
The Impact of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin America, Working Paper no.
9, 2009), Table 14, available at www.uea.ac.uk/dev/faculty/Jenkins/china-latinamerica ;
Lo´pez and Ramos, ‘The Argentine Case ’.
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other Caribbean islands, and all the Central American countries
apart from Costa Rica. China has consistently sought to isolate Taiwan,
although relations between the two have improved somewhat recently.
Under the One-China policy, China refuses to have diplomatic relations
with countries that recognise Taiwan; both countries thus compete for
recognition, particularly from small, less developed nations where it is rela-
tively cheap to obtain the allegiance of the government.19 This is a major
driver of Chinese aid to countries in the region, particularly in Central
America and the Caribbean. When China provided aid to build cricket
stadiums in several Caribbean countries in the run-up to the 2007 World
Cup, both Dominica and Grenada switched recognition from Taiwan to the
PRC.20
In summary, then, the growing relations between China and Latin
America have been primarily driven by economic factors and have been
most signiﬁcant in the area of trade. The main drivers of these developments
have come from the Chinese side, and Latin America has been responding to
agendas where China has been in the driving seat.
The Economic Impacts of China’s Expansion on Latin America
There has been considerable debate in the literature over whether the impact
of China has been predominantly positive or negative for Latin America.
There are a number of diﬀerent ways in which China potentially aﬀects Latin
American trade and investment. First, there is the direct impact of the
growth of Chinese demand on the region’s exports. Second, because of the
size of the Chinese economy, it also has an impact on world prices, par-
ticularly for primary commodities which Latin America exports to other
countries. Third, China’s growing exports of manufactured goods compete
with Latin American exports in other markets. Fourth, increased imports
from China have an impact on Latin American consumers and producers in
their domestic markets. Fifth, China is a major destination for FDI from
other countries, which may aﬀect FDI ﬂows to Latin America. Finally, China
is becoming an increasingly important source of FDI, particularly in de-
veloping countries.
Much of the analysis of the implications of China’s rise has been framed
by a discourse of the ‘ threats ’ (or ‘challenges ’) and ‘opportunities ’ for Latin
America. The dominant optimistic view of the impacts of China emphasises
19 He Li, ‘China’s Growing Interest in Latin America and its Implications ’, Journal of Strategic
Studies, vol. 30, no. 4 (2007), p. 487.
20 Congressional Research Service, Comparing Global Inﬂuence : China’s and US Diplomacy, Foreign
Aid, Trade and Investment in the Developing World (Washington DC, 2008), pp. 162–3.
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the opportunities for the region and tends to minimise the threats.21
The emergence of China as a market has helped generate increased export
revenues and improved terms of trade for the region, while the potential
negative eﬀects in terms of exports to other countries have been conﬁned to
a few countries and industries. Imports from China provide cheap consumer
goods and also increase the competitiveness of local producers, who are able
to acquire low-cost machinery and parts. China is seen as a potential source
of capital to help make up the deﬁcit in terms of investment in infrastructure
in the region. There are also opportunities for attracting FDI to the region if
Latin American countries can integrate into global production networks with
China in the way that some of its Asian neighbours have done.
The pessimistic scenario, in contrast, is that the growing trade links be-
tween China and Latin America are reproducing the classic centre–periphery
relations which Rau´l Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin
America criticised 50 years ago, with the region becoming increasingly spe-
cialised in primary commodity production while the manufacturing sector
contracts in the face of increased Chinese competition both at home and
abroad.22 Multinational companies relocate their plants from Latin America
to China in order to take advantage of the large-scale production, low-cost
labour and competitive exchange rate available there, diverting investment
away from the region, while what little investment comes from China simply
reinforces specialisation in primary products and creates very limited linkages
with the local economy. In this view, the Latin American economies are
caught in the middle between low-cost Chinese production and high-tech
production in the North, resulting in a shrinking of their development space.
A third perspective stresses the diﬀerential eﬀects of China on the South
American economies, on the one hand, and Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean, on the other.23 This view sees the South American economies
21 See, for example, Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal and Andre´s Rodrı´guez-Clare (eds.),
The Emergence of China : Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean
(Washington DC, 2006) ; Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Guillermo Perry (eds.),
China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America : Opportunity or Threat? (Washington DC, 2008) ;
Jorge Bla´zquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodrı´guez and Javier Santiso, ‘Angel or Devil ? China’s Trade
Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets ’, in Javier Santiso (ed.), The Visible Hand of
China in Latin America (Paris, 2007), pp. 45–83.
22 See, for example Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, ‘Fear of China : Is There a Future for
Manufacturing in Latin America? ’,World Development, vol. 35, no. 3 (2007), pp. 355–76 ; Eva
Paus, ‘The Rise of China : Implications for Latin American Development ’, Development
Policy Review, vol. 27, no. 4 (2009), pp. 419–56; Nicola Phillips, ‘Consequences of an
Emerging China : Is Development Space Disappearing for Latin America and the
Caribbean? ’ (Centre for International Governance Innovation, Working Paper no. 14,
Waterloo ON, 2007) ; Rhys Jenkins, ‘El impacto de China en Ame´rica Latina ’, Revista
CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, no. 85–6 (2009), pp. 251–72.
23 Tomoe Funakushi and Claudio Loser, ‘China’s Rising Economic Presence in Latin
America ’, Inter-American Dialogue (June 2005) ; Francisco Gonza´lez, ‘Latin America in the
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which have expanded exports of primary commodities to China as major
beneﬁciaries, while Mexico and Central America and the Caribbean, which
face competition from Chinese manufactured goods in the US market and
have not been major exporters to China, suﬀer potential negative impacts in
terms of both trade and FDI ﬂows.
Table 2 summarises the optimistic and pessimistic views of China’s vari-
ous economic impacts on Latin America. The remainder of this section
discusses each of these impacts in turn.
Chinese competition in export markets
As was pointed out in the Introduction to this essay, the early studies of the
impact of China on other developing countries were prompted by concerns
over the eﬀects on those countries’ exports of China’s entry into the WTO.
In the case of Latin America, this has been the most widely studied of the
economic eﬀects of China’s rise. Most of the early studies were optimistic,
concluding that, apart from Mexico, the countries of the region were less
Table 2. Contrasting Views of the Economic Impact of China on Latin America
Optimistic Pessimistic
Exports to third markets Only a few Latin American
countries are negatively
aﬀected in a small number
of sectors
Many countries and sectors
face competition from China
in export markets
Growth of the Chinese
market
Increased foreign exchange
earnings
Reliance on a small number
of primary product exports
Increased commodity
prices
Improved terms of trade Reinforcing specialisation in
primary production ; price
volatility rather than secular
improvement
Imports from China Reducing cost of living and
investment costs through
lower prices
Displacing domestic
manufacturers and reducing
employment
Chinese FDI Potential for improving
infrastructure
Low levels, tending to
reinforce specialisation in
primary commodities
FDI from other countries Potential for integration of
Latin America into global
production networks
involving China
Diversion of FDI from
Latin America to China
Source : Author’s elaboration.
Economic Equation – Winners and Losers : What Can Losers Do?’, in Roett and Paz
(eds.), China’s Expansion, pp. 148–69 ; Osvaldo Rosales and Mikio Kuwayama, ‘Latin
America Meets China and India : Prospects and Challenges for Trade and Investment ’,
CEPAL Review, no. 93 (2007), pp. 81–103.
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threatened by Chinese exports to third markets than were the Asian eco-
nomies or the transition economies of Eastern Europe, and that the eﬀects
were conﬁned to a few manufacturing industries.24 It was also argued that
over time, ‘LAC’s trade specialization pattern is becoming more comp-
lementary to the specialization pattern of China ’.25
However, other authors, using more recent data and diﬀerent methods,
have argued that the impact of China on Latin American exports has been
both more severe, in the case of Mexico, and more widespread, in terms of
the countries that have been aﬀected, than this optimistic view suggests.26
These studies suggest that China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and the
elimination of import quotas for textiles and garments under the WTO
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005 were followed by a signiﬁcant
increase in competition from China in developed country markets.
Using a methodology based on constant market share analysis developed
by a Brazilian economist, Jorge Chami Batista, the loss of exports in the US
market as a result of the increase in China’s market share was estimated
for 18 Latin American countries for two periods, 1996–2001 and 2001–6
(see Table 3).27 The results shows clearly that while the impact of China on
the region’s exports was very limited up to China’s accession to the WTO in
2001, after 2001 exports to the United States from the 18 countries were 9
per cent lower than they would have been if China had not increased its share
of US imports.28
Table 3 shows the countries most aﬀected by Chinese competition in the
US market in the period between 2001 and 2006. Mexico is third after the
24 Bla´zquez-Lidoy et al., ‘Angel or Devil ’ ; Devlin et al., The Emergence of China ; Patricio Meller
and Gabriela Contreras, ‘La competitividad de las exportaciones chinas en los mercados de
Estados Unidos y Japo´n’ (CIEPLAN, Serie Estudios Socio/Econo´micos, no. 16, 2003) ;
Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Guillermo Perry, ‘Latin America’s Response to
China and India : Overview of Research Findings and Policy Implications ’, in Lederman et
al. (eds.), China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America, pp. 3–35.
25 Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Eliana Rubiano, ‘Latin America’s Trade
Specialization and China and India’s Growth ’ (World Bank, Background Paper for the
Oﬃce of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington DC,
2006).
26 Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, ‘What a Diﬀerence a Few Years Makes : China
and the Competitiveness of Mexican Exports ’, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 35, no. 2
(2007), pp. 219–23; Kevin Gallagher, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and Roberto Porzecanski,
‘The Dynamism of Mexican Exports : Lost in (Chinese) Translation? ’, World Development,
vol. 36, no. 8 (2008), pp. 1365–80 ; Moreira, ‘Fear of China ’ ; Rhys Jenkins, ‘China’s Global
Growth and Latin American Exports ’ (UNU-WIDER Research Paper, no. 2008/104,
Helsinki, 2008).
27 Jorge Chami Batista, ‘Competition between Brazil and Other Exporting Countries in the
US Import Market : A New Extension of Constant-Market-Shares Analysis ’, Applied
Economics, vol. 40, no. 19 (2008), pp. 2477–87.
28 For a fuller analysis see Jenkins, ‘China’s Global Growth ’.
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Dominican Republic and El Salvador. Other Central American countries are
also among the most severely impacted, while even the countries of
Mercosur have lost market share to China in the United States. Countries
not listed, such as the Andean countries, have been relatively unaﬀected,
reﬂecting the fact that the bulk of their exports to the United States are of
primary products and resource-based manufactures, which do not compete
with Chinese exports of manufactured goods.
Thus the competitive threat from China, far from being restricted to a few
countries and diminishing over time, is both widespread and increasingly
signiﬁcant. This is certainly more in line with the perceptions of the private
sector in the region than with the optimistic views put forward by the in-
ternational institutions.29
The debate over the impacts of China on Latin American exports takes
nation-states as the key units for analysis and regards the ‘ threats ’ as being at
the country level. It should be noted, however, that changing trade patterns
often result from the strategies of multinational corporations over the allo-
cation of production and do not reﬂect the outcome of competition between
ﬁrms based in diﬀerent countries. The case of the ‘ threat ’ posed by China to
personal computer (PC) exports from Mexico to the United States illustrates
this very clearly. Between 2001 and 2006 China’s share of US imports of PCs,
Table 3. Latin American Countries Most Aﬀected by Loss of Exports to China in the
US Market, 1996–2001, 2001–6 (% of Country’s Exports to the US)
1996–2001 2001–6
Argentina x1.8 x5.1
Brazil x4.1 x7.7
Costa Rica x1.3 x7.8
Dominican Republic x2.4 x13.0
El Salvador 6.5 x12.3
Guatemala 6.2 x10.5
Honduras 3.8 x7.7
Mexico x1.1 x11.4
Paraguay x6.9 x5.7
Uruguay x5.8 x9.3
Total for 18 Latin American countries x1.0 x9.3
Source : Own elaboration from United States International Trade Commission data available
at dataweb.usitc.gov.
29 See the analysis by the Federac¸a˜o das Indu´strias do Estado de Sa˜o Paulo (FIESP),A ascensa˜o
chinesa e os prejuı´zos a`s exportac¸oes brasileiras para os Estados Unidos (Sao Paulo, 2007). See also
the reports from various Latin American countries by Helen Murphy, Christopher Swann
and Mark Drajem, ‘Economic Outlook : Competition from China Squeezes Developing
Countries ’, International Herald Tribune, 2 April 2007.
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peripherals and parts more than trebled from 14.2 per cent to 45.5 per cent,
while Mexico’s fell by almost half, from 13.9 per cent to 7.5 per cent.30 This
was, to a large extent, the result of several multinational ﬁrms, such as IBM,
Hewlett-Packard and Selectron, transferring production to China. In these
circumstances, where capital is globalised, the main losers from ‘Chinese ’
competition are the workers who lose their jobs or see their wages and
working conditions deteriorating. This reality is obscured by an approach
that takes nation-states as its focus.
The example of the PC industry also illustrates the close connection that
may exist between competition in export markets and diversion of FDI
ﬂows, which have tended to be analysed separately in the existing literature
on China and Latin America. When a US multinational takes a strategic
decision to relocate certain products or production processes from Mexico
to China to supply the US market, this is reﬂected both in changes to the
share of Mexico and China in US imports and in changes to the ﬂows of FDI
from the United States to Mexico and China. A global value chain analysis
brings out these interconnections in a way that approaches based on trade
and investment ﬂows between countries do not.31
Exports to China
The rapid expansion of the Chinese market has made a signiﬁcant contri-
bution to the growth of Latin America’s exports from the late 1990s. The
elasticity of Chinese demand for imports from the region was found by
Daniel Lederman et al. to be high, indicating a major dynamic boost for the
area.32 China is now one of the top three export markets for a number of
Latin American countries.33
It is also worth noting, however, that not all the countries of the
region have shared in this export growth. In 2008 China accounted for over
10 per cent of the total exports of seven Latin American countries
30 Enrique Dussel, ‘The Mexico–China Economic Relationship in Electronics : A Case Study
of the PC Industry in Jalisco ’ (University of East Anglia, programme on The Impact of
China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin America, Working Paper no. 5, 2008),
available at www.uea.ac.uk/dev/faculty/Jenkins/china-latinamerica.
31 For a brief account of this and other related approaches, see Jennifer Bair, ‘Global
Commodity Chains : Genealogy and Review’, in Jennifer Bair (ed.), Frontiers of Commodity
Chain Research (Stanford CA, 2009), pp. 1–34.
32 Daniel Lederman, Marcelo Olarreaga and Isidro Soloaga, ‘The Growth of China and India
in World Trade : Opportunity or Threat for Latin America and the Caribbean? ’ in
Lederman et al., China’s and India’s Challenge, pp. 101–20.
33 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Economic and Trade Relations
between Latin America and Asia-Paciﬁc : The Link with China (Santiago, 2008), Table III.3.
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(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru and Uruguay), but for other
countries in the region its signiﬁcance was relatively minor.34
Some authors have raised concerns over the pattern of specialisation in
trade between Latin America and China.35 Not only have the bulk of exports
been of primary products and resource-based manufactures, but their
share, particularly of the least processed products, has increased over time
(see Table 1). A related concern is that exports to China from the region are
further concentrated in a narrow range of commodities (copper, iron ore,
soybeans) and show little sign of diversifying.
It might be argued that the large share of primary products in Latin
American exports to China is simply a reﬂection of comparative advantage
based on factor endowments : Latin America is endowed with natural re-
sources, while China has an abundance of labour. It would be a mistake to
think of comparative advantage as a given, however. Like other East Asian
countries before it, China has been actively creating a comparative advantage
in key sectors.36 It has used a range of trade and industrial policies to develop
certain stages of global value chains within China, which has led to Latin
American producers increasingly specialising in the early, low-value-added
stages of the chains.
An illustration of this has been the development of the soybean value
chain which supplies the growing demand for animal feed and vegetable oil
in China.37 Although Argentina’s total exports of soybeans and soybean
products to China have increased rapidly since the late 1990s, this growth has
been very unevenly distributed, with exports increasing most in the case of
unprocessed soybeans while soybean meal exports to China have virtually
disappeared. Compared to Argentina’s exports to the rest of the world, its
exports to China are much more heavily concentrated in the early stages of
the value chain. This is explained by the decision of the Chinese authorities
in the late 1990s to develop a local oilseed crushing industry. Several pro-
motional measures were implemented to encourage investment in the in-
dustry and to increase its competitiveness. A number of modern crushing
34 Own estimates based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, available at www2.imfstatistics.
org/DOT/.
35 Sanjaya Lall and John Weiss, ‘China’s Competitive Threat to Latin America : An Analysis
for 1990–2002 ’, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 33, no. 2 (2005), pp. 163–94; Moreira, ‘Fear
of China ’.
36 See Dani Rodrik, ‘What’s So Special about China’s Exports? ’ (NBER Working Paper no.
W11947, 2006).
37 This discussion is based on Andre´s Lo´pez, Daniela Ramos and Cecilia Simkievich, ‘A Study
of the Impact of China’s Global Expansion on Argentina : Soybean Value Chain Analysis ’
(University of East Anglia, programme on The Impact of China’s Global Economic
Expansion on Latin America, Working Paper no. 2, 2008), available at www.uea.ac.uk/
dev/faculty/Jenkins/china-latinamerica.
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plants were established, most of them located in the coastal provinces, near
the ports, to ensure easy access to imported raw materials Leading multi-
national companies such as ADM, Bunge and Cargill, which possessed
crushing plants in Argentina, invested in China and now import soybeans
from Argentina to supply their Chinese plants.
Evidence from the other major value chains in which Latin America is
a signiﬁcant exporter to China suggests a broadly similar pattern. In iron
and steel, Brazil’s trade with China shows an increasing specialisation in
iron ore and concentrates as China rapidly develops its domestic steel
industry ; in copper, reﬁning capacity has expanded in China with Chile
exporting ore and cathodes.38As in the case of competition in export markets,
a detailed analysis of particular value chains can help us to understand better
the processes that underlie the observed patterns of trade.
China’s impact on commodity prices
Although it is generally recognised that the growth of Chinese demand was
an important factor in the commodities boom of 2002–8, the impacts on
Latin America have not been analysed in any detail, except to point out that
the region’s terms of trade improved as a result of higher commodity
prices.39 Given the signiﬁcance of China’s demand for a number of key
products which Latin America sells on the world market, the rise in the
prices of these commodities is an important channel through which China’s
growth has aﬀected the region.40
A detailed analysis of 15 commodities that Latin American countries
export found that earnings were signiﬁcantly higher in 2007 as a result of
the eﬀect of rapid Chinese growth on global demand.41 The bulk of these
38 Alexandre Barbosa and De´bora Miura Guimara˜es, ‘Economic Relations between Brazil
and China in the Mining/Steel Sectors ’ (University of East Anglia, programme on
The Impact of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin America, Working Paper
no. 10, 2009) ; Jonathan Barton, ‘A Study of the Impact of China’s Global Expansion on
Chile : The Copper and Textile Value Chains ’ (University of East Anglia, programme on
The Impact of China’s Global Economic Expansion on Latin America, Working Paper
no. 7, 2009). Both of these papers are available at www.uea.ac.uk/dev/faculty/Jenkins/
china-latinamerica.
39 On the commodities boom see, for example, UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2005
(Geneva, 2005), chap. 2 ; IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2006 : Financial Systems and Economic
Cycles (Washington DC, 2006), chap. 5. One recent exception to the lack of detailed analysis
in this area is Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, ‘China and the Latin America
Commodities Boom: A Critical Assessment ’ (University of Massachusetts, Political
Economy Research Institute, Working Paper no. 192, 2009).
40 See Rosales and Kuwayama, ‘Latin America Meets India and China ’, Table 2.
41 Rhys Jenkins, ‘The Impact of China’s Growth on Global Commodity Prices and Latin
American Export Earnings ’, CEPAL Review (forthcoming, 2011).
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gains came from increased prices for oil and minerals, particularly copper
and iron ore. Indeed, it was estimated that, for the region as a whole,
these indirect eﬀects were more important in terms of additional foreign
exchange earnings than the growth of direct exports to China between 2001
and 2007.42
There are two important implications of this analysis at the level of indi-
vidual countries. Firstly, countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and
Venezuela, which historically exported little to China, nevertheless beneﬁted
from the higher world prices for their oil, gas and minerals that resulted from
the growth of Chinese demand. Secondly, however, countries which are net
importers of oil and minerals were losers as a result of China’s impact on
commodity prices. Most of the Central American countries and Uruguay
found themselves in this position.43 Since the Central American countries
are also among those most aﬀected by competition from China in the US
market, this reinforces the view that they have been negatively aﬀected by the
growth of China.
The growth of imports from China
Despite the fact that competition from Chinese imports is the most
politically sensitive aspect of closer relations as far as a number of Latin
American countries are concerned, it has received comparatively little
attention in the academic literature. The extremely rapid growth of imports
from China since 2003 has given rise to complaints of ‘unfair competition’
and accusations of dumping from local manufacturers, and, as noted
above, has led to some Latin American governments adopting protectionist
measures.44
The major concern is that Chinese imports are displacing local production
and jobs, but how justiﬁed is this fear? In contrast to the case of exports to
China, all the Latin American countries, even those which do not have
diplomatic relations with the PRC, have seen China’s share in their total
imports increase signiﬁcantly. Because this is a relatively recent phenom-
enon, however, there has been little empirical analysis of the impact of
Chinese imports, and the few studies that have been carried out do not cover
the recent surge in imports. For example, studies by Lucio Castro et al. on
Argentina and Enrique Dussel on Mexico, which found very little evidence
that imports from China reduced manufacturing employment signiﬁcantly,
only covered the period up to 2003.45 More recent evidence for Brazil
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., Table 5. 44 Murphy et al., ‘Economic Outlook’.
45 Lucio Castro, Marcelo Olarreaga and Daniel Saslavsky, ‘The Impact of Trade with China
and India on Argentina’s Manufacturing Employment ’, in Lederman et al. (eds.), China’s
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and Argentina (up to 2006) suggests some negative impact of Chinese
imports on domestic manufacturing, but this impact is limited to a few in-
dustries.46
It is argued in some quarters that the growth of imports from China
has had a positive impact in Latin America, increasing the competitiveness of
local manufacturers through cheaper inputs and low-cost machinery and
equipment.47 While it is true that a signiﬁcant proportion of the region’s
imports from China are indeed parts and capital goods, there have in fact
been no studies to show what impact this has had on Latin American
competitiveness.
A further issue that has emerged recently with the growth of imports
from China has been the eﬀect on regional integration. The growth of intra-
regional trade in Latin America has slowed down in recent years. There is
also evidence that Brazil, particularly, is facing increased competition from
China for its exports to Argentina and other regional markets.48 This raises
the question of how far the growth of imports from China has in fact con-
tributed to the stagnation of the process of integration in the region.
Much of the evidence on the eﬀects of increased imports from China is
anecdotal, and this is an area which requires further research. What is clear is
that the rapid growth of imports has led to a change in the balance of trade.
Whereas China had a trade deﬁcit with Latin America between 2003 and
2005, the recent growth of imports has led to a surplus in its trade with the
region. Even countries with signiﬁcant commodity exports to China, such as
Argentina and Brazil, are now in deﬁcit. This has been reﬂected in a less
favourable view among the public of the implications of China’s economic
growth, particularly in Argentina.49
Impacts on foreign direct investment
There are two ways in which Chinese growth potentially aﬀects FDI in
Latin America. The ﬁrst involves Chinese inward investment in the region.
and India’s Challenge to Latin America, pp. 269–90 ; Enrique Dussel, ‘The Mexican Case ’, in
Jenkins and Dussel (eds.), China and Latin America, pp. 279–385.
46 Jenkins, ‘The Latin American Case ’.
47 Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, China-Brazil Trade Report, Year 1, Issue 1 (Rio de
Janeiro, 2008), p. 4.
48 Daniel Sica, ‘Algunos elementos de ana´lisis sobre la presencia de China en la relacio´n
Argentina–Brasil ’, Economı´a Online (www.abeceb.com) (2007) ; Barbosa and Guimara˜es,
‘Consumer Electronic Sector ’.
49 Pew Global Attitudes Poll, May 2008, quoted in David Shambaugh, ‘China’s
Multidimensional Thrust into the Latin American Region’ (address to Third International
Conference of the China–Brazil Business Council, ‘China’s Presence in Latin America ’,
Sa˜o Paulo, 30 June 2009).
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Despite high expectations of signiﬁcant inﬂows for a number of years,
as indicated above, these have remained relatively low until now and
have mainly been driven by the same factors as trade : the acquisition of
raw materials and access to the Latin American market for Chinese
exports.
A more interesting question is that of the impact that the growth of
China has had on FDI ﬂows from other countries to Latin America. The
main concern here has been the potential diversion of FDI from the
region as a result of the increased attractiveness of China as a destination
for foreign ﬁrms.50 Similar worries were voiced in Asia, particularly in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, at the time of
China’s accession to the WTO.51 Subsequent studies have failed to ﬁnd
evidence of signiﬁcant diversion of FDI from other Asian countries to
China, however, and several have even found a positive relationship between
FDI ﬂows to China and to some of its neighbours.52 This is generally inter-
preted as reﬂecting a complementarity between China and other Asian
economies arising from their integration into regional or international
production networks.
In Latin America, the prima facie case that the growth of China has led
to a diversion of FDI is based on the observation that inﬂows to China
grew rapidly in the 1990s while investment in Latin America and the
Caribbean lagged behind. Cravino et al. point out, however, that the lag was
mainly during the period between 1990 and 1997, and that since then Latin
America has performed rather well relative to China in attracting FDI.53
In any case, any such correlation does not necessarily indicate a causal
relationship.
Several empirical studies have attempted to test the FDI diversion
thesis for Latin America more systematically, but with mixed results. Some
50 Gabriel Correra Lo´pez and Juan Gonza´lez Garcı´a, ‘La inversio´n extranjera directa : China
como competidor y socio estrate´gico ’, Nueva Sociedad, no. 203 (2006), pp. 114–27.
51 See the statements by Mahatir Mohamad, former prime minister of Malaysia, and Supachai
Panitchpakdi, former deputy prime minister of Thailand, quoted in Benoıˆt Mercereau,
‘FDI Flows to Asia : Did the Dragon Crowd Out the Tigers? ’ (IMF Working Paper
WP/05/189, Washington DC, 2005).
52 Barry Eichengreen, and Hui Tong, ‘ Is FDI to China Coming at the Expense of other
Countries? ’ (NBER Working Paper no. 11335, 2005) ; Busakorn Chantasasawat, K. C.
Fung, Hitomi Lizaka and Alan Siu, ‘The Giant Sucking Sound: Is China Diverting Foreign
Direct Investment from Other Asian Economies? ’, Asian Economic Papers, vol. 3, no. 3
(2005), pp. 122–40; Chengang Wang, Yingqi Wei and Xiaming Liu, ‘Does China Rival its
Neighbouring Economies for Inward FDI? ’, Transnational Corporations, vol. 16, no. 3 (2007),
pp. 35–60.
53 Javier Cravino, Daniel Lederman and Marcelo Olarreaga, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America during the Emergence of China and India : Stylized Facts ’, in Lederman
et al., China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America, pp. 121–42.
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ﬁnd that FDI in China had a negative impact on FDI in Latin America,
particularly in Mexico, while others ﬁnd no discernable eﬀect.54 Only one
study ﬁnds a positive relationship between FDI in China and in Latin
America.55 It is diﬃcult to argue that this study reﬂects the integration of
Latin America into global production networks involving China, however,
particularly since there was no positive relationship when the relationship
between investment in China and in Latin America was tested using data on
US manufacturing FDI in the two regions.
These studies diﬀer in terms of their methodology, time period and
countries covered, making it diﬃcult to compare their results. They all
involve a relatively high level of aggregation which may hide signiﬁcant
impacts on individual countries or sectors. This suggests a need for further
work on this issue, particularly case studies of countries and sectors where
diversion is most likely to take place.56
Political Implications of China’s Economic Expansion
There is little doubt that the economic links between China and Latin
America will continue to grow as China becomes an even more signiﬁcant
actor in the global economy. What, then, are the likely political implications
of this for the region?
Four aspects of the political economy implications of China’s impact on
Latin America are of particular signiﬁcance. First, how will the rise of China
aﬀect US hegemony in the region? Closely related to this is the eﬀect of Latin
America’s growing relationship with China on the autonomy and bargaining
power of the Latin American states internationally, and particularly in re-
lation to the United States. Third, what are the implications of Latin
America’s growing relations with China for democracy in the region? Finally,
54 Alicia Garcı´a Herrero and Daniel Sanataba´rbara, ‘Does China Have an Impact on Foreign
Direct Investment to Latin America? ’, in Santiso (ed.), The Visible Hand, pp. 133–59; Jose´
Luis de la Cruz, Antonina Ivanova Boncheva and Antonio Ruiz-Porras, ‘Competition
between Latin America and China for US Direct Investment ’, Global Economy Journal, vol. 8,
no. 2 (2008), pp. 1–20; Busakorn Chantasasawat, K. C. Fung, Hitomi Lizaka and Alan Siu,
‘Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia and Latin America : Is there a People’s Republic of
China Eﬀect? ’ (Asian Development Bank Institute, Discussion Paper no. 17, Tokyo,
2004) ; Eichengreen and Tong, ‘FDI to China ’. Chantasasawat et al. ﬁnd no impact on the
level of FDI in Latin America ; they do ﬁnd an impact on Latin America’s share of total
FDI in developing countries, but argue that China is not a major factor in this.
55 Javier Cravino, Daniel Lederman and Marcelo Olarreaga, ‘Substitution between Foreign
Capital in China, India and the Rest of the World : Much Ado about Nothing ’ (World
Bank, Background Paper for the Oﬃce of the Chief Economist for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Washington DC, 2006).
56 The case study of the Mexican PC industry discussed earlier is a good example of such
work.
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will China’s inﬂuence strengthen the role of the state in Latin America’s
economies and lead to a shift away from neoliberalism in the region?
China’s challenge to the hegemony of the United States
The Right in the United States sees China’s growing involvement in Latin
America as a signiﬁcant threat. Congressman Dan Burton, in a statement at a
hearing before the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, stated :
I am very concerned with the rise of inﬂuence China is pursuing in our Hemisphere
and I believe it is important that the United States grasps the economic, social and
national security implications of a Latin America under the thumb of China. Once
China is able to move in and expand control, it will be diﬃcult to turn the tide.57
Much US political analysis from a ‘realist ’ perspective shares this deep sus-
picion of Chinese motives, seeing Chinese expansion as part of a geopolitical
strategy to develop a multipolar international system in place of one that is
dominated by a single superpower.58 As June Teufel Dreyer comments :
Markets and raw materials are only part of the attraction that Latin America holds
for Beijing_ The larger and arguably more important motivation of Beijing’s
strategy is geopolitical, not economic.59
Stephen Johnson and Evan Ellis identify competition with the United States
as one of the key areas of interest for China in expanding its involvement in
Latin America, along with economic interests and isolating Taiwan.60 Ellis
also highlights the ways in which the growing presence of China is increasing
the constraints on US operations in Latin America.61
An alternative view sees Chinese interests in Latin America as part of
China’s ‘going global ’ policy – in other words, as primarily economic.
Political and military relations are seen as following on from closer economic
ties, which are the main focus of Chinese diplomacy in the region.62 It is
pointed out that the Chinese government has been very careful not to be
57 Congressman Dan Burton, Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Aﬀairs, ‘The New Challenge : China in the
Western Hemisphere ’ (Washington DC, 2008).
58 Xiang Lanxin, ‘A Geopolitical Perspective on Sino-Latin American Relations ’, in Cynthia
Arnson, Mark Mohr and Riordan Roett (eds.), Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin
America (Washington DC, 2007), pp. 59–63 ; Xiang Lanxin, ‘An Alternative Chinese View’,
in Roett and Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion, pp. 44–58. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for emphasising the point about the realist perspective to me.
59 June Teufel Dreyer, ‘The China Connection ’ (University of Miami, Center for
Hemispheric Policy, China-Latin America Task Force, 2006), pp. 1–2.
60 Stephen Johnson, ‘Balancing China’s Growing Inﬂuence in Latin America ’, The Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1888 (2005) ; Evan Ellis, China in Latin America : The Whats and
Wherefores (Boulder CO, 2009), chap. 2.
61 Ibid., pp. 283–4. 62 Domı´nguez, China’s Relations with Latin America, pp. 8–9.
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seen as challenging the United States in the region.63 Indeed, China rec-
ognises that the United States considers Latin America to be its backyard.64
Despite the rapid growth of trade between China and Latin America
over the past decade, the United States and European Union remain more
important trading partners for the region than China. For Latin America as a
whole, trade with the United States is four times as important as trade with
China, while trade with the EU is more than 50 per cent greater than that
with China.65 As was shown earlier, China is even less signiﬁcant in terms of
FDI to Latin America ; investment from the OECD countries accounts for
the bulk of inﬂows to the region. Unlike the situation in aid-dependent
African countries, there are limited opportunities in Latin America for China
to increase its inﬂuence through grants and concessionary loans, except in
the case of some of the small Central American and Caribbean countries.
In those cases, however, China’s main objective has been to get countries
to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, rather than to
undermine US hegemony.
China’s main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of
raw materials and market access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has
an interest in continuing economic and political stability in the region, and
would not want to undermine this through a confrontation with the United
States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed
against the United States, could also adversely aﬀect Chinese interests in
the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example, expressed
concerns over the implications for his country’s oil interests of institutional
uncertainties created by the revision of the country’s constitution and bi-
lateral investment agreements.66
Another factor that inﬂuences China’s policy towards the region is a rec-
ognition that its relationship with the United States is much more important
to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American
country, both economically and politically.67 As a result, China’s policy to-
wards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allying
itself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the
Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relations with
63 See Li, ‘China’s Growing Interest ’ ; Shixue, ‘The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective ’ ; Juan
Tokatlian, ‘A View from Latin America ’, in Roett and Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion,
pp. 59–89; Barbara Stallings, ‘The US–China–Latin America Triangle : Implications for the
Future ’, in Roett and Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion, pp. 239–59.
64 Shixue, ‘The Chinese Foreign Policy Perspective ’, p. 40.
65 Calculated from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. Figures for 2008.
66 Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, Cai Runguo, quoted in Ellis, China in Latin America, p. 123.
67 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, ‘ Introduction : Assessing the Implications of China’s
Growing Presence in the Western Hemisphere ’, in Roett and Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion,
p. 2.
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both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected
governments of diﬀerent political hues more recently. China has not
been keen to be identiﬁed closely with the anti-US rhetoric adopted by
President Cha´vez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations
with countries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil,
Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships
with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely
associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.
Greater autonomy in Latin America
What is seen as a threat from the US side may be regarded in Latin America
as an opportunity to reduce dependence on the United States. There is,
therefore, a parallel debate within Latin America over whether or not the
presence of China gives greater autonomy and space for negotiation to the
countries of the region. Sergio Cesarı´n and Martı´n Pe´rez Le-Fort see China’s
increasing global inﬂuence and its strategy of promoting multipolarity
and multilateralism as an opportunity to counterbalance US power in the
region.68 In contrast, Rafael Ferna´ndez de Castro and Laura Dı´az Leal
describe the belief that China can be a counterweight to the United States in
Latin America, and especially in Mexico, as a ‘ false illusion’.69
China at present has neither the economic nor the military capacity to
challenge US hegemony in the western hemisphere, nor is it in its interests to
do so. This does not, however, mean that the growth of China does not
provide a degree of increased autonomy for governments in Latin America.
One example of this was the conﬂict over the American Service-Members’
Protection Act, which required the suspension of military aid and training for
countries that refused to agree not to prosecute US military personnel for
war crimes. Fear that this would lead the countries aﬀected to increase
military cooperation with China led the US administration to re-authorise
military training programmes for 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries
in 2006.70
The diversiﬁcation of economic links which the growth of China has
made possible has, to some extent, reduced the Latin America’s dependence
68 Sergio Cesarı´n, ‘The Relationship between Latin America and China : Realities and
Trends ’, in Aranson (ed.), Enter the Dragon?, pp. 17–25 ; Martı´n Pe´rez Le-Fort, ‘China y
Ame´rica Latina : estrategias bajo una hegemonı´a transitoria ’, Nueva Sociedad, no. 203 (2006),
pp. 89–101.
69 Rafael Ferna´ndez de Castro and Laura Dı´az Leal, ‘Falsa ilusio´n : China, el contrapeso de
Estados Unidos en el hemisferio occidental ’, in Enrique Dussel and Yolanda Tra´paga
(eds.), China y Me´xico : implicaciones de una nueva relacio´n (Mexico City, 2007), pp. 105–17.
70 China–Latin America Task Force, ‘Findings and Recommendations of the China-Latin
America Task Force ’ (University of Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, 2006) p. 24.
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on the United States, but this should not be exaggerated since, as was
pointed out above, the United States remains far more important economi-
cally to the region than China. Indeed, for some countries it could be argued
that the growth of China has led to increased dependence on the United
States. This is most clearly the case in the Dominican Republic and the
Central American countries, where one of the arguments put forward for
signing the DR-CAFTA agreement with the United States was the threat
posed by Chinese competition in the US market.71 Thus, paradoxically, the
rise of China contributed to an agreement which ties the countries involved
more closely to the United States.
A threat to democracy?
Some of those who believe that the rise of China is a threat to US geopolitical
interests in Latin America also argue that China’s growing inﬂuence is un-
dermining democracy and free market policies in the region:
The Chinese model suggests that a society can lift itself out of poverty using a model
of growth that is not necessarily democratic. Although many elements of the
Chinese development model are not applicable to the Latin American case, the
model sends out the message that discipline, not democracy, is the key to develop-
ment and prosperity.72
This interpretation sees China’s increasing involvement in Latin America as
potentially undermining US eﬀorts to promote political reform, human
rights and free trade in the region, and as providing ideological support to
anti-US, anti-democratic and anti-free market leaders in countries such as
Ecuador and Nicaragua.73 Others dispute the claim that the success of China
is undermining support for democracy in Latin America, arguing that China’s
internal political model is not particularly attractive to the region and that
support for democracy remains strong there.74
There is little evidence to support the claim that Chinese involvement
is undermining democracy in the region. Although it may be necessary to
take China’s claims of non-interference in the internal aﬀairs of other
countries with a pinch of salt, as argued above, China has adopted a prag-
matic approach and has been prepared to do business with a variety of
political regimes. The fact that concerns about the anti-democratic impacts
71 The Oﬃce of the US Trade Representative claimed that ‘CAFTA would provide regional
garment-makers_ a critical advantage in competing with Asia ’ : CAFTA Facts : The Case
for CAFTA (Washington DC, 2005), p. 1.
72 China–Latin America Task Force, ‘Findings and Recommendations ’, p. 21.
73 Evan Ellis, ‘The Military–Strategic Dimensions of Chinese Initiatives in Latin America ’
(University of Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, China-Latin America Task Force,
2006), p. 9. 74 Tokatlian, ‘A Latin American View’, p. 64.
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of China’s presence are voiced particularly vehemently by sections of
the political Right in the United State, which has in the past supported
authoritarian regimes in the region, merely reinforces scepticism over these
claims.
An alternative economic model ?
China’s economic model, with its emphasis on a strategic role for the state,
is seen by a number of authors as oﬀering important lessons for the
region.75 As Alex Ferna´ndez-Gilberto and Barbara Hogenboom argue,
‘China’s rise shows developing countries that there are viable alternatives to
the Washington Consensus ’.76 Although China liberalised its economy, the
policies adopted were endogenously driven rather than being imposed ex-
ternally, as was the case with the Washington Consensus in Latin America.
As a result, the Chinese state was able to regulate and control the process of
globalisation of the Chinese economy. In Latin America, conversely, exten-
sive liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of the economy reduced the
ability of the state to exercise signiﬁcant control over it.
The impact of China on development strategy in Latin America is con-
tradictory. In objective terms, China’s rise has intensiﬁed the trend towards
increased reliance on exports of primary products, the threat to domestic
manufacturing and the narrowing of the ‘development space ’ for the region
which began with the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s.77 Ideologically, how-
ever, increased awareness of China’s success and the poor economic per-
formance of most Latin American countries that took up the policy
recommendations of the Washington Consensus have reopened the debate
over development strategy in the region. There has been growing talk of the
‘Beijing Consensus ’, although its precise content remains unclear.78 This
raises the question of whether China represents an alternative model for
Latin America, and if so, what are the key features of that model and the
lessons to be learnt?
A number of political leaders in the region have spoken warmly of the
Chinese model. In 2004 President Ne´stor Kirchner of Argentina expressed
his admiration for China’s economic achievements and indicated that
75 Robert Devlin, ‘China’s Economic Rise ’, in Roett and Paz (eds.), China’s Expansion,
pp. 111–47; Paus, ‘The Rise of China ’.
76 Alex Ferna´ndez Gilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, ‘Latin America and China :
South–South Relations in a New Era’, in Alex Ferna´ndez Gilberto and Barbara
Hogenboom (eds.), Latin America Facing China : South–South Relations beyond the Washington
Consensus (forthcoming). 77 See Phillips, ‘Consequences of an Emerging China ’.
78 A. Cha, ‘China Uses Global Crisis to Assert its Inﬂuence ’, Washington Post Foreign Service,
23 April 2009.
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Argentina should learn from the Chinese example.79 During the Brazilian
presidential elections of 2006, both President Lula and Geraldo Alckmin, the
Social Democratic Party candidate, indicated that they were impressed with
certain aspects of the Chinese development model.80
The lessons drawn from China in many ways parallel those from previous
industrialisers in East Asia, namely the need to use strategic government
intervention to develop national technological capabilities and the need for
investment to expand domestic knowledge-based assets.81 While policies
should be country- and context-speciﬁc, governments need to play an active
role in shaping strategic priorities aimed at moving up the value chain.82 In
eﬀect, the Chinese experience is a further vindication of the ‘developmental
state ’ as a key to economic transformation.
Conclusions
Over the past three decades, China’s re-emergence as a world power, rapid
economic growth and integration with the global economy have been dra-
matic. Over the last decade this has started to impact on Latin America in a
number of ways. The main driver of China’s involvement in Latin America
has been economic, reﬂected in the rapid growth of trade links. Until now
FDI ﬂows have lagged a long way behind trade, although they are likely to
increase in the future. Closer political relations with China have in the main
resulted from growing economic links, apart from the issue of Taiwan, where
political concerns have driven economic relations.
This Commentary has reviewed the debate over the implications of
China’s growing global inﬂuence for Latin America. In terms of economic
impacts, the view that China has been an ‘angel ’ for Latin America is proving
over-optimistic, and the concerns raised by the critics are real. Although
some countries and some sectors in the region have beneﬁted in the short
and medium term from the booming Chinese demand for primary products,
these beneﬁts have not extended to all the countries of the region or
necessarily been widely distributed within those countries where they have
been attained. The concern that the growth of China is reinforcing special-
isation in primary production which may be detrimental for long-term
growth prospects is real, implying that the Latin American countries need to
upgrade and diversify their exports to China.
79 Jiang Shixue, ‘Una mirada china a las relaciones con Ame´rica Latina ’,Nueva Sociedad, no. 203
(2006), pp. 62–88. 80 Li, ‘China’s Growing Interest ’, p. 849.
81 For an earlier discussion of the implications of the experience of the East Asian newly
industrialising countries for Latin America, see Rhys Jenkins, ‘Learning from the Gang:
Are There Lessons for Latin America from East Asia? ’, Bulletin of Latin American Research,
vol. 10, no. 1 (1991), pp. 37–54. 82 Paus, ‘The Rise of China ’.
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This paper has also shown that the optimistic view that plays down the
negative impacts of Chinese competition on Latin American exports is not
supported by the evidence for the period since China joined the WTO. More
countries and more sectors in the region have been negatively aﬀected than is
commonly admitted in the academic literature. Despite the rapid growth of
imports from China over the last few years, there has been relatively little
research on the impacts of Chinese competition in the domestic market so
far, although it has been a cause of political tensions between some Latin
American countries and China. This is a key area requiring further research.
The low level of Chinese FDI until now has meant that its impact on Latin
America has been limited, although as it increases in the future, the im-
plications are likely to become an important area for research. More attention
has been given to the impact of China on investment from other countries
coming to Latin America, particularly in relation to the possibility of diver-
sion from the region. The results of these studies have been mixed, but they
have all been highly aggregated. A more fruitful approach for future research
is likely to be case studies of particular value chains which investigate the
ways in which leading ﬁrms have restructured their global operations and
supply lines.
As argued earlier, China’s political engagement with Latin America has
been mainly driven by its economic interests. China has neither the desire
nor the capacity to challenge US hegemony in the region, as some US poli-
ticians and commentators fear. While it is true that the emergence of China
has enabled some Latin American countries to reduce their dependence on
the United States, giving them slightly more room for manoeuvre, in other
cases, most notably the DR-CAFTA countries, it has contributed to them
becoming even more closely tied to the United States through the free trade
agreement.
There is little evidence to support the claims that China is undermining
democracy in Latin America, either through its support for undemocratic
regimes or through its example as a successful model of economic devel-
opment under an authoritarian regime. There is more evidence that some
elements of the Chinese economic model are seen as attractive by some Latin
American governments as an alternative to the Washington Consensus. This
falls a long way short of adoption of any ‘Beijing Consensus ’, however, and
should be seen simply as a new example of a more activist role for the state,
which has been called for by neostructuralists in Latin America.
Much of the debate on the impacts of China on Latin America has
focused on the region as a whole. Some authors, however, have drawn a
distinction between the South American countries, which have been the
main beneﬁciaries economically, and Mexico and Central America and the
Caribbean, where the negative impacts have been concentrated. This is a
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valuable corrective to some of the over-generalised claims often made
about the impacts of China, but does not give a complete picture. Indeed, it
tends to emphasise the diﬀerence between countries exporting primary
commodities, which are seen as winners, and exporters of manufactures,
who are the main losers. As already indicated, exporters of primary products
may not beneﬁt in the long term from the resulting specialisation.
Furthermore, this view ignores completely the impact of Chinese compe-
tition in the domestic markets of the countries concerned. A more complete
picture will only emerge with in-depth analysis of individual countries which
takes into account all the diﬀerent channels through which China aﬀects their
economies.83
The debate on the impacts of China has also tended to give relatively
little attention to the potential eﬀects within countries, but there are clearly
winners and losers within each country. The winners have been mainly large
mining conglomerates (both state-owned and privately owned), commercial
farmers and large-scale agribusiness. In many cases, where capital is inter-
nationally mobile, the main losers are likely to be industrial workers facing
pressure from lower wages in China. Locally owned ﬁrms in the manufac-
turing sector may also be losers as they ﬁnd their proﬁt margins squeezed
in domestic, regional and international markets as a result of Chinese
competition. These diﬀerential impacts within countries also have political
implications. Diﬀerent interests adopt diﬀerent positions vis-a`-vis China and
are active in domestic political debates.84 The impacts of China on diﬀerent
groups within countries and the political implications of the domestic alli-
ances formed around these issues are important areas for future research.
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